One of the Blogs the Idle Man considers a must read is:
Defence of the Realm
Whilst I don't always agree with the authors opinions, I do find the articles interesting and thought provoking. Currently there is a series running on this blog entitled: Lost Before it Started, which is highly critical of the senior echelons of the British Army, the MOD and their Political Masters.
Whilst the main theme is the Authors view that the British Army Mission in Iraq was more than a failure it was a defeat and the implications for ongoing operation in Afghanistan. He backs this up with an analysis of the Politics, both internal Army as well as Government and how in part the problems stem back to the Blair vision of European defence integration.Of special interest is how these policy failures have been exacerbated by systemic (and therefore fatal to the troops on the ground) flaws in equipment procurement (something the idle Man has believed was the case for over 30 years). The author plans seven articles in this series and I suggest they must be read in order as follows:
Lost before it started - Part 1
Focuses on the Blair vision of European defence integration and its effects on UK Defence Strategy and in particular the Army and the perceived procurement requirements.
Lost before it started – Part 2
Looks at the effects of the 2003 Defence Whitepaper and how this lead the senior echelons of the Army to focus on implications of this strategy change (without seriously challenging them), rather than the immediate needs of the Army in Iraq. Leading to the setting of long term procurement projects, whilst to a large extent ignoring major shortfalls in current equipment,
Lost before it started - Part 3
A new Chief of the General Staff take over – General Sir Richard Dannatt. But the madness goes on.
Lost before it started – Part 4
This compares the Army as envisioned under the 2003 Whitepaper (the so called fantasy army) as might have been, and finds it still casts a long shadow over the operational capabilities of the Army.
Lost before it started – Part 5
The Army's response to criticisms, and its broader response to its own failures, reflecting on the nature of the problems which affect the Army high command..
Lost before it started – Part 6
The vexed question of under-resourcing. Throughout the Iraqi campaign, the mantras of "underfunding" and "over-stretch" were frequently in the media and came easily from the lips of opposition politicians. More "boots on the ground" and more money were the answers to all ills. However, as always, there are more to these issues than meets the eye.
Lost before it started – Part 7
In this final part, the Author on whether the British Arny, despite the handicaps, could have succeeded. Reviewing what actually did happen after the British had retreated to their final base at Basra airport, we believe they could.
Defence of the Realm
Whilst I don't always agree with the authors opinions, I do find the articles interesting and thought provoking. Currently there is a series running on this blog entitled: Lost Before it Started, which is highly critical of the senior echelons of the British Army, the MOD and their Political Masters.
Whilst the main theme is the Authors view that the British Army Mission in Iraq was more than a failure it was a defeat and the implications for ongoing operation in Afghanistan. He backs this up with an analysis of the Politics, both internal Army as well as Government and how in part the problems stem back to the Blair vision of European defence integration.Of special interest is how these policy failures have been exacerbated by systemic (and therefore fatal to the troops on the ground) flaws in equipment procurement (something the idle Man has believed was the case for over 30 years). The author plans seven articles in this series and I suggest they must be read in order as follows:
Lost before it started - Part 1
Focuses on the Blair vision of European defence integration and its effects on UK Defence Strategy and in particular the Army and the perceived procurement requirements.
Lost before it started – Part 2
Looks at the effects of the 2003 Defence Whitepaper and how this lead the senior echelons of the Army to focus on implications of this strategy change (without seriously challenging them), rather than the immediate needs of the Army in Iraq. Leading to the setting of long term procurement projects, whilst to a large extent ignoring major shortfalls in current equipment,
Lost before it started - Part 3
A new Chief of the General Staff take over – General Sir Richard Dannatt. But the madness goes on.
Lost before it started – Part 4
This compares the Army as envisioned under the 2003 Whitepaper (the so called fantasy army) as might have been, and finds it still casts a long shadow over the operational capabilities of the Army.
Lost before it started – Part 5
The Army's response to criticisms, and its broader response to its own failures, reflecting on the nature of the problems which affect the Army high command..
Lost before it started – Part 6
The vexed question of under-resourcing. Throughout the Iraqi campaign, the mantras of "underfunding" and "over-stretch" were frequently in the media and came easily from the lips of opposition politicians. More "boots on the ground" and more money were the answers to all ills. However, as always, there are more to these issues than meets the eye.
Lost before it started – Part 7
In this final part, the Author on whether the British Arny, despite the handicaps, could have succeeded. Reviewing what actually did happen after the British had retreated to their final base at Basra airport, we believe they could.
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