Report by the NAO on MOD Armoured Vehicle Procurement

The National Audit Office (NAO) has produced a report (20th May 2011) on The Cost Effective Delivery of Armoured Vehicle Capability. The NAO press release although couched in unemotional language, is damning of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) standard procurement process for Armoured Vehicles.
This is the key part of the Press Release dealing with the Standard Procurement Process:

The suspension and cancellation of a number of key armoured vehicle projects since the 1998 defence review has resulted in the Armed Forces facing a significant shortage in the principal armoured vehicles they require, until at least 2024-2025.

Today's National Audit Office report found that the Department's standard acquisition process has been undermined by a combination of over-ambitious requirements and unstable financial planning. Despite the commitment of considerable resources, since 1998, the MOD has received only a fraction of the armoured vehicles it has set out to buy through its standard acquisition process.

The Department's reluctance to compromise in setting technologically demanding requirements under its standard acquisition process has put the timely and cost-effective delivery of the equipment at risk. Unwieldy procurement processes have not coped well with rapid changes to equipment requirements in the light of operational experience, resulting in a number of armoured vehicle projects being delayed or abandoned.

Armoured Vehicle projects have also suffered from unstable budgets and continual changes to financial plans. As the NAO reported in its Strategic Financial Management of the Defence Budget report, the cycle of unrealistic planning followed by cost overruns has led to a need to find additional short-term savings on a regular basis. Spending to date includes £321 million on cancelled or suspended projects and a further £397 million funding on-going, but delayed, projects. Without significant additional investment sustained over time, the Department will have a shortfall in the armoured vehicles it says it needs until at least 2024-2025.

I am reminded of some of the comments and conclusions of the Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence by Bernard Gray on the 15th October 2009 - For those without the time to read through the near 300 Page report should check out some of the other links on the MOD - Review of Acquisition Page.

Returning to the new NAO Report, it does have some 'nicer' things to say about the MOD's handling of Urgent Operational Requirements:

To address shortfalls in equipment for current operations, such as in Afghanistan, the Department has placed greater reliance on the Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) since 2003, at an additional cost of £2.8 billion. This has been more successful and has significantly improved protection levels for UK forces against today's threats. The UOR process is not a sustainable substitute for the standard acquisition process. While some UOR vehicles may be taken into the core fleet, the Department does not expect these vehicles to offer a long-term solution to its armoured vehicle needs.

The 'more successful' phrase might, I feel be disputed, certainly Richard North when he was covering the UOR purchases in his Defence of the Realm Blog would probably disagree. My view is the rash of 'panic' buying by the MOD did eventually meet operational requirements, but the process was expensive in both in British Casualties and Financially enormous.

The Government's initial reaction to the report was given by Defence Equipment minister Peter Luff a Career Politician with no Defence Experience prior to him appointment as a minister, who said:

"The report highlighted serious flaws in the process left by the previous Labour government.We are absolutely committed to a funded and realistic defence equipment programme to ensure our Armed Forces are properly equipped and taxpayers get value for money," he said. "Given the disastrous state of the department's finances we inherited, this change will take time."

Whilst it is true that the previous Labour Government on Defence Policy in general and Defence Procurement in particular was very poor, the same can be said of all previous Governments, Conservative, or Labour going back as far as the 1960's.
When this is coupled with the culture that exists in the MOD, also stretching back into the 1960's it is surprising the British Armed Services ever get the right equipment, almost never on time and never at the budgeted cost.

Sadly this NAO Report after the initial Media furore dies down and some temporary discomfort for some Officials in the MOD, being asked difficult questions, will like other Similar Reports be quietly ignored.

NAO The Cost Effective Delivery of Armoured Vehicle Capability Report Links:
Press Release
Full Report - The Cost Effective Delivery of Armoured Vehicle Capability -  PDF (730kb)
Executive Summary

Media Reaction to the Report:
BBC-Armed forces 'face vehicle shortages until 2025'
Guardian -Auditor attacks chaos in equipping British troops
Independent -Afghan war 'to leave UK short of armour'
Mail Online -MoD 'cost lives' by wasting £718m on vehicles never builtMirror -Troops 'face shortage of vehicles'
Reuters -Army faces armoured vehicles shortage - watchdog
Sky News -UK Forces' Vehicle Shortage 'Costs Millions'

Specialist Media:
Defence Viewpoints - NAO slams UK armoured vehicle procurement

Related Posts in this Blog:
Cormorant Communications System - Lame Duck in a War Zone
Lost Before It Started - A Defence of the Realm Series
Nimrod exposes contempt for Armed Forces

Cormorant Communications System - Lame Duck in a War Zone

I have been leaving the slating of the Ministry of Defence systemic failures in Procurement to the redoubtable Richard North over at the Defence of the Realm, but this one it appears has slipped his notice. Fortunately The Register picked up on this in its story of the 8th September: Army's £114m battle-comms net not up to Afghan demands with the sub-heading of: Israeli off-the-shelf replacements rushed in and then BBC News published a very similar story on the 10th September: MoD withdraws £114m comms system in its Technology Section.

In non-technical terms, the Cormorant System was designed to replace the various legacy and ad-hoc off the shelf equipment used by the British Joint Task Force Headquarters with a purpose designed integrated system to provide the communications links to the in-theatre sub-commands, certainly a worthy objective.

The £114 Million contract was placed with EADS Wales, part of EADS UK and the system was scheduled to start in service deliveries during 2002. But the project suffered a series of delays and wasn't declared operational until December 2004. Now an MoD project that is only two years late, is actually unusual as often it is much longer.

But a two year delay to ensure that the Cormorant System met the needs of the Joint Services Commands, and that would, with regular updating meet its 20 Year planned service life, would surely be worth it, wouldn't it?

Almost immediately it was introduced, muted criticism (because the Armed Forces aren't allowed any other kind) began and in even in summary are pretty damning: "cursed with some of the worst procurement decisions, shoddy workmanship, non-existent quality control and so-called support arrangements which verge on criminal neglect ".

As an aside: Cormorant is deployed at the in-theatre command level, it needs to integrate with tactical systems such the Ptarmigan System which was already approaching obsolescence when introduced during the 1980's and by the time it was fully functional in the 1990's was obsolete, but will only start to be replaced by the BAE Systems Falcon in 2010.

In Afghanistan the Cormorant Systems role is to link the British Main Operational Bases, exactly what it was designed to do. BUT it isn't up to it!
So to supplement a system that was specifically designed to avoid the need for ad-hoc off the shelf equipment, back in June the MoD rush ordered off the shelf the Israeli RADWIN 2000 System and it is currently being implemented by Horsebridge Network Systems.What makes this even more ironic is a quote from Major Lee Hawkes:
"RADWIN’s systems meet our requirements, without additional modification or equipment."

From the above it would appear that the RADWIN System will provide added capability to Cormorant, but this does not actually reflect the true state of affairs as it now appears much of the Cormorant Infrastructure in Afghanistan is being withdrawn back to the UK and replaced by the much cheaper RADWIN System.

If the Cormorant saga was an isolated case it would be a disgrace, but from the leaks of the Gray Report (See: Times Online 23rd August and 24th August ), this is just another example of the Ministry of Defence systemic failures in Procurement, However in my opinion, these failings are deeply rooted and go back as far as the early 1960's. in part exacerbated by the ever changing Political view of Defence , which rarely has anything to do with the Nations Defence Requirement, but instead mainly with Party Political expediency and short term Political gain.

Lost Before It Started - A Defence of the Realm Series

One of the Blogs the Idle Man considers a must read is:
Defence of the Realm

Whilst I don't always agree with the authors opinions, I do find the articles interesting and thought provoking. Currently there is a series running on this blog entitled: Lost Before it Started, which is highly critical of the senior echelons of the British Army, the MOD and their Political Masters.

Whilst the main theme is the Authors view that the British Army Mission in Iraq was more than a failure it was a defeat and the implications for ongoing operation in Afghanistan. He backs this up with an analysis of the Politics, both internal Army as well as Government and how in part the problems stem back to the Blair vision of European defence integration.Of special interest is how these policy failures have been exacerbated by systemic (and therefore fatal to the troops on the ground) flaws in equipment procurement (something the idle Man has believed was the case for over 30 years). The author plans seven articles in this series and I suggest they must be read in order as follows:

Lost before it started - Part 1
Focuses on the Blair vision of European defence integration and its effects on UK Defence Strategy and in particular the Army and the perceived procurement requirements.

Lost before it started – Part 2
Looks at the effects of the 2003 Defence Whitepaper and how this lead the senior echelons of the Army to focus on implications of this strategy change (without seriously challenging them), rather than the immediate needs of the Army in Iraq. Leading to the setting of long term procurement projects, whilst to a large extent ignoring major shortfalls in current equipment,

Lost before it started - Part 3
A new Chief of the General Staff take over – General Sir Richard Dannatt. But the madness goes on.

Lost before it started – Part 4
This compares the Army as envisioned under the 2003 Whitepaper (the so called fantasy army) as might have been, and finds it still casts a long shadow over the operational capabilities of the Army.

Lost before it started – Part 5
The Army's response to criticisms, and its broader response to its own failures, reflecting on the nature of the problems which affect the Army high command..

Lost before it started – Part 6
The vexed question of under-resourcing. Throughout the Iraqi campaign, the mantras of "underfunding" and "over-stretch" were frequently in the media and came easily from the lips of opposition politicians. More "boots on the ground" and more money were the answers to all ills. However, as always, there are more to these issues than meets the eye.

Lost before it started – Part 7
In this final part, the Author on whether the British Arny, despite the handicaps, could have succeeded. Reviewing what actually did happen after the British had retreated to their final base at Basra airport, we believe they could.

Gurkha Courage - Justice for the Gurkha's

A Gurkha soldier serving with the British Army in Afghanistan has been killed in action. Meanwhile four of his comrades in the Royal Gurkha Rifles have been awarded the George Cross, second only to the Victoria Cross in terms of gallantry awards. Once again the Soldiers from a far land are serving our Queen and Country in Combat. Their predecessors have fought and died in many lands on our behalf winning the admiration of those who served along side them and the respect of the enemy they faced.

Yet if they retired from the British Army prior to 1997 they do not have the right of residence in the UK See: Gurkha Justice Campaign Post

As Remembrance Day approaches it is timely to remind people that One hundred thousand Gurkhas fought in the First World War. They served in the battlefields of France in the Loos, Givenchy, Neuve Chapelle and Ypres; in Mesopotamia, Persia, Suez Canal and Palestine against Turkish advance, Gallipoli and Salonika. One detachment served with Lawrence of Arabia.
250,000 Nepalese Gurkhas served in the Second World War and in Britain's (so called) Small Wars to the present day


The Campaign led by Joanna Lumley now has the support of Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons and a Letter has been sent to the Home Secretary requesting that Right of Settlement be extended to all former Gurkhas 

So with cross party support, it shouldn't be difficult to get the relevant legislation drafted and passed in this Parliament!

The last flying Vulcan Needs Help - Please Sign the Petition (British Citizens Only - Sorry)

Those of you who have seen the Avro Vulcan flying will know that it is an awesome sight. Now there is only one flying example, XH558 and this is endanger of being grounded forever.

The Vulcan is a living symbol of the Cold War Era when along with the Victor and initally the Valiant formed the Aircraft Types equipping the RAF Medium Bomber Force and the four minute warning, meant something other than alerting you to your next appointment, or to check the dinner in the oven.

However even in those dangerous times the Vulcan Squadrons could indulge in at a least a wry smile,
Like the successful Attack on New York which so frightened the Pentagon:
Extract from a Guardian Article :
n 1961, four nuclear bombers entered United States airspace, flying high above the maximum altitude of the defending American fighters. Three jammed the ground-based and airborne radars directed at them. The fourth arrived unchallenged and unforeseen, over New York City.

The aircraft was an Avro Vulcan bomber, capable of carrying a 21,000lb nuclear payload. It looked like a scary version of Concorde. The New York stunt was part of an Anglo-American military exercise which proved the plane's ability to deliver nuclear bombs wherever they might be needed, whoever the enemy. The RAF called it "the tin triangle".
End Extract
Come to think of it the RAF Vulcan Crews did play some serious tricks on the USAF as in Red Flag 1977 or 1978 where they used the Girlfriends and Wife's Picnic (with lots of Cars) at a specific geographical location as an offset aiming point to get them on target (tsk, tsk). Getting even snottier on one departure by doing a spectacular full bore ultra short take-off at max weight (thus wrong footing all the TV and Still Cameras), whilst an RAF Type was telling the press with feigned surprise 'that was how they always did it'!

Even when not armed and dangerous, the Vulcan was used to 'show the flag' across the world from Australia, through the Far East . USA and Canada. A single Vulcan doing even a simple display, was as exciting as the Red Arrows.

In 1982 when the timetable for phasing out was set, the Vulcan went to war for the only time in its long career when single Aircraft, each supported by Victor Tankers flew the Black Buck Raids over the Falklands.

Whilst The Government supports the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight through the RAF , the entire Vulcan project has so far only been supported by private donations and volunteers. Whilst we are in a global financial crisis, Government support to keep XH558, is flying is not even going to show on Government Spending statistics.

So please sign the 10 Downing Street Petition: to keep Vulcan.XH558

Honouring the past and inspiring the future.

Links:

• The Vulcan Operating Company and Vulcan to the Sky Trust Site

• THE Vulcan Site to visit is: Vulcans in Camera

Vulcan Videos:
There are a lot of recent video's of XH558 since its return to flight, but the following are often overlooked:

• Anti-Radiation Flash White (The Death Ride Era): The Avro Vulcan - If this had been for real, the surviving Aircraft and their Crews would have had no Airfields to return to!
• Vulcan and Blue Steel (With Test Launch and Vickers Valiant shots)
• What might have been: Vulcan Skybolt Testing
• The Year after operational retirement Avro Vulcan airshow display Commentator/Interviewer the late Raymond Baxter
• AVRO VULCAN XH558 DISPLAY SCAMPTON '91
• Flying the Vulcan

Safety Test Failed, Not if we change the Paperwork

The Armed Forces Minister and Head of the Royal Navy publicly apologised on the 12th June for grievous "systemic failings" that led to two Royal Navy Crew being killed by an underwater explosion whilst working on Oxygen Units aboard HMS Tireless which was on exercise off Alaska last year.

This apology followed as the result of the publication of the report from the Board of Enquiry which detailed failures in:

• acquisition
• manufacture
• transport
• storage
• stowage and logistics management

Which covers just about everything. Except the report didn't stop there as it concluded the MoD had a:

• Lack of Understanding
• Lack of Quality Control

So in Summary the Ministry of Defence was incompetent.

But it does get worse:
The inquiry discovered some of the units were left in the open at the dockside for up to two weeks before being installed in the submarines, and that other oxygen generators which had failed manufacturers' safety checks may have also been put into service.

In the ministers statement, he included the following:
Quote
"I am extremely sorry, particularly to the families of those who lost their lives or were injured." The board of inquiry found that 996 "self-contained oxygen generators" used in Royal Navy subs had been found to be faulty and subsequently brought back into service. The paperwork relating to them had been altered"
Unquote

Ah now we move from incompetence and negligence and into a whole new ball game called : Criminal Mismanagement and Falsification of Records (in this case Safety Related).

One assumes Criminal Proceedings with be brought against any Civilians involved and Court Martial for those serving in the Armed Forces.
Sorry I am was being naive for a moment, no the reality will probably be the culture within the MoD will not change, the guilty will go unpunished and the MoD with its part-time political Master will continue on their merry way, apologising when its failures kill service personnel, because apologising doesn't cost money, whereas doing what is required does!

Nimrod exposes contempt for Armed Forces

Not my Headline (I wish it was), but from a Daily Telegraph Article by Con Coughlin.
Not only is it an interesting Article in its own right, but the comments from readers struck me as both pertinent and interesting. To give you a sample the following is that last paragraph of Con Couglin's Article:
Quote:
Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, seemingly so underemployed at the Ministry of Defence that he also finds time to be Scottish Secretary, has admitted that two thirds of the Nimrods are “not fit for purpose”, but has done little to rectify the situation. He should hang his head in shame.
Unquote
In another time perhaps the last sentence would have read: He should Hang.

Now one of the Comments from a reader - It is long, but worth reading:
Quote:
The MOD have always possessed an accountant driven mentality instead of an operational requirement ethos towards military kit.

I was in the services when the Nimrod started to replace the Shackleton, back in the late 60’s, and the general consensus then, was that it was an extensively modified cobbled up Comet, with Spey engines. That it is still in service today as further modified variants are wheeled out, is a remarkable achievement in cost cutting, but not much else.

After the MR2 exploded over Kandahar, with the cause known to be related to in flight refuelling operations, remarkably a second incident took place on 5th November 2007 to a second MR2, (XV235), also over Afghanistan, while the investigation into the loss of XV230 was ongoing. This incident also occurred during in-flight refuelling when the crew called a Mayday after observing leaking fuel. They managed to land the aircraft. It was only after the second incident, that in flight refuelling was suspended for this type, and it was only due to providence that a second aircraft was not lost.

The board of Inquiry into XV235 deduced that the most probable cause, was escaped fuel contacting an air pipe at 400 degrees Celcius, after penetrating between two layers of insulation. Contributory factors were listed as:Age of the aircraft; Maintenance policy; Failure of hazard analysis and lack of a fire detection and suppression system; and, not identifying the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures.

Back in 1992 a program for replacement for the MR2 was started, the Nimrod MRA4
(New engines in refurbished airframes) was selected in 1996. This was delayed because the airframes supplied to BAe systems were non standard. ‘In service’ date had slipped from 2003 to 2009, and by 2005 the cost jumped from £2.8 billion to £3.5 billion, meaning the RAF would get fewer planes.

Sadly, the Nimrod is not alone in the tragedy of errors

The Hercules shot down over Baghdad was operating without self sealing fuel tanks in a war zone. Another cost saving?

link

I think the British owe their aircrews better than this.

The MOD and successive governments, have treated the military as nothing more than a cost cutting exercises for decades. This government in particular goes down in history with a part-time defence secretary, to emphasize the low priority which Labour assigns to the military. With soldiers still being sent out in ‘snatch’ Land Rovers, it is little wonder that the RAF is flying antique junk.

Posted as a comment to the Telegraph Article by Michael Barningham on May 23, 2008 10:13 PM
Unquote